Seaborne Petrochemical Spill Analysis Within the United States, 1992–1999 by Nicholson, Benjamin L. et al.
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
Seaborne Petrochemical Spill Analysis Within the
United States, 1992–1999
BENJAMIN L. NICHOLSON*
United States Coast Guard
Office of Congressional Affairs, 6-ICA
2358 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515, USA
ANASTASSIOS N. PERAKIS
Department of Naval
Architecture and Marine Engineering
University of Michigan
2600 Draper Road, NAME Building
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-2145, USA
JONATHAN W. BULKLEY
Department of Civil and
Environmental Engineering and
School of Natural Resources and
Environment and
Center for Sustainable Systems
University of Michigan
430 East University, Dana Building
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-1115, USA
ABSTRACT / Through discussion of causative factors and
examination of historical data, petrochemical spill prevention in
US waters is reviewed. Unintentional petrochemical outflow is
analyzed in a comprehensive manner and presented as a hier-
archical sequence of antecedent events to reveal the trends of
causative factors leading to release. Specifically, a seaborne
petrochemical spill is examined in terms of four basic, ante-
cedent events: (1) an underway source, (2) a failure incident,
(3) a marine accident capable of breaching the hull and cargo
block, and (4) the onset of outflow. These events are further
subdivided into underlying, contributing events to form a caus-
ative framework for spill prevention. While a hierarchical review
is not necessary to uncover the elements of causation, it does
provide a comprehensive and logical structure that clearly de-
fines these elements in terms of occurrence frequency and
contribution to resulting outflow. It is found that relatively
small, frequent spills less than 40,000 liters (10,567 gallons),
attributable to human operator failures, leading to grounding,
and cargo transfer system failure accidents, dominate US sea-
borne petrochemical outflow from 1992 to 1999. Given the
frequency of groundings, structural reinforcement regulations
such as those contained in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (re-
quiring double hulls) appear well justified. However, passive
restraint systems are secondary to the need for vigilant train-
ing and licensing of tank vessel operators.
Nations have typically addressed environmental is-
sues in an ad hoc manner, striving to remedy a given
crisis with reactionary, prohibitive policy (Woodward
2000, Yaffee 1982). Just as the sinking of the HMS
Titanic and the Three Mile Island nuclear incident
prompted governmental action, the grounding of the
Exxon Valdez and its subsequent release of 42 million
liters (11 million gallons) of crude oil—the largest
petrochemical spill ever in US waters—catalyzed the
US Congress to pass historic legislation. US Public Law
101–380, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA90), trans-
formed petrochemical transport operations and their
regulation within US waters by emphasizing pollution
prevention and establishing a policy goal of “zero oil
outflow” (similar to the zero discharge goal of Clean
Water Act, P.L. 92–500).
OPA90 mandates new tank vessels to be of double-
hull construction and requires the phase-out of single-
hulled vessels no later than 2015 (OPA90’s Title IV,
§4115; refer to the Springer website [http://www.link.
springer-ny.com/link/service/journals/00267/index.
htm] for additional information containing a synopsis
of OPA90 requirements). Because groundings were the
predominant accidents contributing to oil spills in 1990
[60% of tanker spills (EST News 1999)] and because
US ports are comparatively shallow by international
standards [average depth of major US petrochemical
ports is approximately 13 m (43 ft,) (US ACE 1999), as
compared to an average depth of 23 m (75 ft), for
major international petrochemical ports (Lloyd’s
1999)], OPA90 mandated the implementation of the
most proven design for this accident type while also
considering the second most frequent hull-rupture mis-
hap, collisions.
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While the double-hull design does provide a reduc-
tion in outflow probability, it only addresses a single
element in the sequence of events that lead to an
unintentional release of petrochemicals. Furthermore,
current pollution databases often classify spill causation
into a single categorical event—such as hull/machinery
failure, grounding, collision, etc.—resulting from hu-
man error rather than comprehensively identifying the
sequence of factors that lead to outflow. Since, “there
has been little effort to characterize [the tank vessel]
system as a whole and to determine the areas that offer
the greatest potential for risk reduction, the National
Research Council has determined that maritime safety
as a whole could benefit from the increased use of
quantitative and qualitative risk analysis” (USCG 1995).
Accordingly, this paper analyzes seaborne spills in a
holistic manner as petrochemical outflow is considered
the final outcome of antecedent events. This approach
is based upon the premise that petrochemical spills are
random occurrences to be modeled as a conditional
sequence of events, otherwise known as a hierarchy.
Therefore, the objective of this paper is to define the
causative factors contributing to outflow and to identify
the underlying sources of error and risk within the
context of a hierarchical framework. This framework is
intended to provide a more comprehensive perspective
of a spill event. The result of this effort is to provide a
tool for improving the allocation of pollution preven-
tion resources and identification of areas that may re-
quire regulatory reform in order to meet the implicit
and explicit objectives of OPA90.
Seaborne Petrochemical Outflow in US Waters
Although seaborne spills constitute less than 10% of
the total annual marine petrochemical outflow, the
subsequent impact can be catastrophic upon the ambi-
ent environment, (NRC 1991). Petrochemicals (crude
oil, product, or some variation of petroleum-related
cargo) are transported by sea via tank vessels—barges
or ships. Rare, yet horrific outflows such as the 1989
Exxon Valdez oil spill punctuate the history of oil trans-
port and its regulation within US waters and around the
world (DuPont 1992).
OPA90’s structural mandates can be characterized
as a form of prohibitive policy in that they do not allow
for any variation of vessel design other than what is
specified within its §4115. Two assumptions are gener-
ally made about prohibitive policy: (1) that it is based
upon technical certainties and, (2) that it “limits [ad-
ministrative] discretion, precluding any balancing of
costs and benefits and excluding outside parties from
influencing implementation” (Yaffee 1982). Rather
than technical certainty, a range of alternative tank
vessel designs based upon probabilistic outflow preven-
tion is what has developed in the post-OPA90 era,
leading to the establishment of a policy goal and regu-
latory standard of “zero oil outflow.”
An underway oil tank vessel is initially modeled as a
“system” subdivided into three phases: prevention, mit-
igation, and response. Each of these phases contains
multiple event elements that sequentially evolve
through a network comprised of prespill causation fac-
tors, accident-induced outflow, attempts to mitigate
and stop outflow, and post-spill cleanup and response
operations. Since the prevention phase includes multi-
ple events that lead up to the onset of petrochemical
outflow, a seaborne spill can be approached holistically,
as an aggregate sequence of causative events. There-
fore, to best prevent a seaborne spill, reliability and risk
reduction techniques need to be applied for each caus-
ative event. To this end, spill prevention regulations
must exhaustively address: (1) each of the individual
elements of spill causation, (2) the risks associated with
each causative element, and (3) the sequential relation-
ship of these elements leading to unintentional out-
flow.
Environmental Risk of Outflow
Definition of Environmental Risk
Risk can be informally defined as a product of the
probability of occurrence of a hazardous event and the
magnitude of resulting, harmful consequences (NRC
1991). A seaborne petrochemical spill can be consid-
ered a hazardous event, as it is a release of a substance
with the inherent ability to inflict harm upon the ma-
rine environment (often expressed in ecological and
fiscal terms). Therefore, the magnitude of environmen-
tal risk can be defined as a product of the frequency of
spills and the resulting, negative consequences (repre-
sented by outflow magnitude). The magnitude of out-
flow risk in US waters is directly influenced by multiple
factors, including: vessel traffic patterns; vessel type;
vessel design and construction; geographical, environ-
mental, and meteorological conditions; limitations of
navigational accuracy; and the uncertainties associated
with human performance.
Quantification of Outflow Risk
The ratio of the volume of oil spilled per volume of
oil transported may be the most compelling metric in
the quantification of spill risk, in that it compares the
consequences (outflow volume) with a normalized
baseline (volume transported via tank vessels) (NRC
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1991). Based on USCG data for the period 1974–1978,
the ratio for oil tankers is 3.3  105 (33 liters lost per
million liters transported) and for barges 1.7  105
(17 liters spilled for every million liters shipped) (NRC
1991).
For the period 1980–1990, an average year included
9.5  106 liters (2.5  106 gallons) of oil spilled and
6.4  1011 liters (1.7  1011 gallons) transported via all
tank vessels within US waters (NRC 1991). These fig-
ures yield a spill-to-transport ratio of 1.5  105 or an
average of 15.0 liters of oil spilled for every million liters
shipped within US waters (NRC 1991).
For the period of 1992–1999, the average yearly
volume of petrochemicals spilled in US waters from all
tank vessels (barges and tankers) was 21.7  105 liters
(5.7  105 gallons) while the average yearly volume of
petrochemicals transported in US waters by all tank
vessels was 10.5  1011 liters (2.8  1011 gallons) (Dick-
ey 1999). This yields a spill-to-transport ratio of 2.1 
106 or 2.1 liters of petrochemicals spilled for every
million liters transported (D. Dickey Personal Commu-
nication).
Since the enactment of OPA90, the USCG has found
(NRC 1998): The average number of oil spills over
40,000 liters (10,567 gallons) has dropped by approxi-
mately 50% from pre-1991 levels. Liters spilled per
million liters shipped has been reduced from an annual
average of 10 liters spilled per million liters shipped for
the years 1987–1990 to 5 liters spilled per million liters
shipped during the years 1991–1997—a 50% decrease.
For the period of 1992–1999, this number has dropped
even further to 2.1. There have been no spills greater
than 4 million liters (approximately 1 million gallons)
since 1990.
The significant decrease in petrochemical outflow
cannot be attributed to the advent of a mandatory
double-hull design under OPA90. It is logical to pre-
sume, however, that the decrease in accidental spillage
from tank vessels since the Exxon Valdez accident is a
function of numerous efforts to improve marine pollu-
tion prevention, including expanded spill liability pro-
visions under OPA90 as well as the negative marketing
implications of environmental degradation.
Examination of Spill Components
In order to examine the individual elements of a
spill, it is assumed that there are a finite number of
event paths that can lead to the occurrence of uninten-
tional petrochemical outflow. The analysis of such an
event must begin with a source of petrochemical cargo.
An underway oil tank vessel transiting US waters is
considered the initial event of the seaborne spill se-
quence for the purposes of this paper.
Source of Outflow
To improve the reliability of tank vessels, OPA90
included a double-hull mandate within Title IV, §4115.
Because of the substantial costs and operational uncer-
tainties associated with the double-hull design, there
has been considerable controversy over this regulation.
In 1992, the USCG conducted an extensive technical
analysis to assess alternative designs that could poten-
tially improve maritime safety and environmental pro-
tection (North 1999). This analysis found that the sin-
gle-hull design (Figure 1A) was inadequate in terms of
outflow prevention (NRC 1991, IMO 1997). The dou-
ble-hull and mid-deck designs (Figure 1F) were found
preventatively superior in all cases (NRC 1991, IMO
1997). The International Maritime Organization
(IMO) specifically recognized the mitigation attributes
of the mid-deck design through the implementation of
Regulations 13F and G of Annex I of the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,
1973/78 (MARPOL), equivalently endorsing the dou-
ble-hull and mid-deck designs through a quantitative
pollution prevention index scale (IMO 1997).
The USCG interpreted OPA90 such that the double-
hull was mandated to prevent oil outflow. “Therefore,
when evaluating potential alternatives, the USCG’s
premise was that a vessel’s ‘zero oil outflow character-
istics’ and quantity of mean and extreme outflow could
not be balanced against each other” (North 1999). This
rationale was further justified by the wording of the US
Clean Water Act (CWA) stating, “Congress hereby de-
clares that it is the policy of the United States that there
should be no discharges of oil or hazardous substances
into or upon navigable waters of the United States”
(North 1999). It was then determined that any tank
vessel design alternative must have a probability of zero
oil outflow, for both collisions and groundings, equal to
or better than that of a double-hull. The USCG con-
cluded (North 1999): the double-hull design was the
most effective in preventing the majority of oil spills; no
design could prevent significant outflow under a severe
accident scenario; and no alternative design could be
endorsed as equivalent or superior to the double-hull.
As previously noted, the authors do not presume
that the double-hull design is responsible for the nota-
ble decrease in accidental petrochemical outflow over
the last ten years. Rather, the revised regulatory com-
position of OPA90, combined with the substantial in-
crease in public perception with regard to corporate
environmental stewardship, are the most likely factors
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that have contributed to improved environmental per-
formance of tank vessels.
Two pending studies are examining the double-hull
issue. The Marine Board and US Department of Trans-
portation initiated a study of double-hull alternatives to
establish an equivalency evaluation procedure that not
only maintains a high standard of environmental pro-
tection, but also encourages more innovative designs
(North 1999). Secondly, the USCG-chaired Ship Struc-
ture Committee and the Society of Naval Architects and
Marine Engineers have initiated a study intending to
technically evaluate design performance and address
the issue of fire and explosion hazards within the dou-
ble-hull void space.
Failure Incident Contributing to Outflow
The next event in the sequence leading to seaborne
outflow is a failure incident that links the point of
origin (source) to the hull rupture-inducing accident
and the subsequent unintentional release of petro-
chemical cargo. While the tank vessel carries the haz-
ardous cargo, it is the unintentional failure of opera-
tions or the occurrence of an extreme event—human,
mechanical, or otherwise—that leads to an accident
capable of breaching the vessel’s hull and cargo block.
Human operator error. The most common failure in-
cident within the sequence of events leading to a sea-
borne oil spill can be associated with the human com-
ponent of the tank vessel system. Between 60% and
80% of oil discharges can be attributed to some form of
human operator error (USCG 1995, Ornitz 1997). The
severity of those errors and the actions that follow are
the key factors in the extent of pollution caused by an
operator-error-induced spill. While it is apparent that
operator errors will always occur, the goal is to elimi-
nate the unrecoverable errors that lead to a total system
failure. The study of operator reliability includes ad-
vanced training and licensing programs for personnel
(USCG 1993), ergonomic design innovations (ABS
1998), human reliability analysis (HRA), and compre-
hensive pollution prevention plans such as the USCG’s
Prevention Through People (PTP) program (USCG
1995, Card 1995).
Mechanical failure. The transportation of petrochem-
icals by sea relies upon the function of mechanical
devices. The failure of propulsion, steering, power gen-
eration, or cargo transfer system devices can prove
disastrous for a vessel that depends on such mecha-
nisms to maintain positive control. The application of
reliability evaluation techniques is used to not only
Figure 1. Various oil tanker design mid-ship sections; three cargo tanks across (NRC 1991).
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predict common modes of failure, but also to facilitate
safer system designs (Billinton 1992). All nonmain-
tained mechanical systems will eventually fail; however,
it is the understanding of the nature of failure and its
probability that assists in the improvement of system
reliability.
Navigational system failure. Navigational system fail-
ures not attributable to human operator error are ex-
tremely rare. These failures result from contact with an
uncharted object, using a misplaced aid to navigation, a
sudden system or component failure (i.e., satellite fail-
ure), or some other type of unforeseen failure beyond
the control of the vessel’s piloting team. Prudent navi-
gation calls for redundancy; however, reliance upon
failed components can obviously induce severe mari-
time casualties. The USCG estimates the US aids-to-
navigation system to be better than 99.7% reliable and
the US Air Force estimates the satellite-based global
positioning system (GPS) to be at least 99.0% reliable
(USCG NAVCEN 1999).
Extreme weather. Because “the outstanding character-
istic of the open ocean is its irregularity,” the marine
environment poses a dynamic problem to both the
naval architect and mariner in the prevention of weath-
er-induced casualties (Beck and others 1989). The un-
certainties associated with sea conditions compel de-
signers and operators to probabilistically and
statistically account for extreme weather—leaving room
for error and anomalies.
Marine Accident Contributing to Outflow
Following the failure incident, the next event is the
occurrence of a marine accident or casualty. To achieve
open communication between the sea and the tank
vessel’s petrochemical cargo, a breach of the vessel’s
cargo containment integrity must result from one of
the following types of marine casualties: grounding,
collision or allision, fire/explosion, structural failure,
or cargo transfer system failure.
Grounding. A grounding accident may be defined as
the unintentional contact of a ship’s hull with the
ocean floor; this includes any protrusions or objects
that encompass the ocean’s bathymetric landscape.
The double-bottom and double-hull designs are in-
tended to provide for additional protection against
grounding (NRC 1991). In addition, the USCG has
initiated regulations for minimum under-keel clear-
ance based upon given climatic and geographic condi-
tions to further reduce the occurrence of this type of
accident (OSIR 1996).
Collision/allision. The event of two vessels impacting
one another is defined as a collision, while the contact
of one vessel with a stationary object, such as a dock or
pier, is referred to as an allision. While a grounding is
a function of one vessel’s actions, a collision is much
more complex as it involves the combined actions of
two independent vessels, their piloting teams, and risks
associated with their respective cargo. An allision can
be thought of as an event similar to a grounding in that
one object is fixed and the causative factors lie solely
within the vessel (assuming the object is not improperly
placed within a navigable waterway). Thus, the com-
plexity of a collision/allision is derived from the mul-
tiple inputs to the accident scenario; predominantly
relating to the human operator’s interface with the
navigational system.
Fire/explosion. Shipboard fires and explosions consti-
tute another type of accident that can potentially in-
duce petrochemical outflow. Onboard an oil tank ves-
sel, the combination of electric and mechanical
equipment with potentially volatile cargo and fuel cre-
ates an omnipresent risk of fire or explosion (Gentile
and Dickenson 1995). Moreover, a fire onboard a vessel
is especially hazardous in that there is no immediate
assistance available other than what can be provided by
shipboard fire extinguishing systems and the efforts of
the crew. The destructive potential of fires explains why
these accidents often lead to oil outflow and sinking.
Proper response training and the incorporation of ship-
board fire protection systems are the means by which
this type of accident can be mitigated to prevent deg-
radation of the hull’s integrity.
Structural failure. A failure of the ship’s hull struc-
ture can create open communication between cargo
and sea. If the ship’s structure is not properly main-
tained and certain climatic conditions exist, the integ-
rity of the vessel can be compromised. Therefore, in-
tensive structural reliability techniques are
incorporated within the vessel design process. In addi-
tion, the shift in emphasis to oil outflow reduction and
elimination has included design improvements to the
subdivision structure of the cargo hold (Daidola 1995).
Refer to Figure 1 for example cross-sectional diagrams
of subdivision structures (three tanks across).
Cargo transfer/containment system failure. One of the
most common types of accidents contributing to a sea-
borne petrochemical spill is that of a failure or mal-
function of the tank vessel’s cargo transfer or contain-
ment system (including the piping network, valves,
control devices, etc.). Proper training of the cargo sys-
tem operators as well as reliability-based design is the
means by which these accidents are either reduced or
eliminated.
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Unintentional Outflow
The result of the marine accident is a breach of hull
and cargo block, thus leading to outflow. Once the
integrity of the hull and cargo block is compromised,
free communication between petrochemical cargo and
the sea exists. The rupture of the hull instigates a phase
transition within the analysis of an oil spill from one of
prevention to one of mitigation as well as response. At
this juncture, outflow reduction and stoppage take the
place of preventative actions.
The Causation Hierarchy
Although systems are commonly modeled as a se-
quential combination of events, most systems are, in
fact, hierarchical in nature—a conditionally dependent
sequence of antecedent events that causes a larger,
more severe event. The analysis of petrochemical out-
flow data for the period 1992–1999 is approached as a
systematic decomposition of a complex event into its
contributory components. This approach aims to
clearly define the possible causative elements and the
sequential pathways comprised of these elements that
lead to the larger, more complex event, hence, the
term “hierarchical.” The intended result is an explicit
framework characterizing the sequential distribution of
causative elements for a large-scale event in terms of
occurrence frequency and consequence contribution
(Figure 2).
Because of the direct relationship between the cau-
sation and prevention of a seaborne pollution event,
the systematic analysis of outflow causation is beneficial
and necessary to the attainment of the USCG’s goal of
zero oil outflow. By analyzing a spill event as a hierar-
chy, one can clearly define: the possible causative fac-
tors contributing to a spill, the historical frequency and
severity distribution of those factors, and the historical
frequency and contributing severity distribution of the
sequential, causative pathways leading to a spill event.
The prevention of petrochemical outflow through
the examination of singular events is limited due to the
randomly dependent association between the elements
that sequentially lead to spillage (involving the se-
quence both to and from the individually contributing
events). This limitation, combined with the NRC’s as-
sertion stressing the need for additional risk analysis
techniques and comprehensive study, led to the hier-
archical analysis of available petrochemical outflow
data from 1992 to 1999. To this end, seaborne petro-
chemical outflow is approached holistically, as a hier-
archical aggregation comprised of sequentially depen-
dent, antecedent events—each with an inherent
Figure 2. Hierarchical block diagram for prevention phase of a seaborne petrochemical spill.
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probability of occurrence—that contribute to the cau-
sation of a spill.
Although human operator error has continued to be
the predominant contributory event leading to a hull-
breaching accident that results in petrochemical out-
flow, it is not the definitive “cause” of a given spill
scenario. For example, while a collision between two
vessels may lead to a petrochemical spill event, it is the
compromise of the hull and cargo block, allowing open
communication between cargo and sea, that actually
causes the spill. All collisions do not result in outflow;
therefore, the cause is the rupture of the cargo tank’s
integrity as a result of a collision. A collision must be
preceded by antecedent events (a spill-inducing acci-
dent can not just happen without preceding events
occurring, such as a navigational error, human opera-
tor error, or a machinery failure). The distribution of
causative factors—those events preceding and leading
to the spill-inducing accident—and the various types of
hull rupture accidents are not revealed unless a system-
atic study of marine operations and historical accident
data is conducted.
Data Integration
Recent petrochemical spill data obtained from the
USCG’s Marine Safety Information System (MSIS) da-
tabase (Dickey personal communication) is applied to
the framework to examine the modern causation pat-
terns of accidental outflow. Specifically, the occurrence
frequency of each event element and the resulting
consequences—in terms of outflow magnitude—are ex-
amined. The data quantifies each event component
and the associative links to and from the preceding and
following events, thus allowing for a comprehensive
examination of pathway frequency through the hierar-
chical framework and the resulting outflow conse-
quences.
Because OPA90 changed the way tank vessels con-
duct the transport of petrochemicals through US wa-
ters and the manner by which environmental regulators
approach related violations, the passage of this legisla-
tion can be considered the modern benchmark for US
petrochemical spill analysis. Therefore, petrochemical
spill analysis within US waters can be divided into two
periods: the pre-OPA90 era and the post-OPA90 era.
Although 1990 marks the passage of OPA90 into law,
the majority of its programs were not implemented
until 1992. Therefore, the post-OPA90 era is defined as
the period since its mandates were active, or 1992 to the
present. This paper specifically focuses on the period of
1992–1999 to characterize the recent distribution of
petrochemical spill causation within US waters. How-
ever, for the purpose of background comparison, an
overview of the pre-OPA90 era is also provided.
The pre-OPA90 era. During the 1950s and through
the early 1970s, tank vessels grew considerably in terms
of cargo capacity due to technological shipbuilding
improvements and economic necessity. Due to the draft
of these vessels, the USCG lobbied the IMO to impose
the requirement of double bottoms on tank vessels to
provide for additional protection against groundings.
This design was effectively rejected on the basis that the
majority of the world consisted of deep ports in which
collisions were a greater risk than groundings. US wa-
ters are comparatively shallow by international stan-
dards and the majority of spills were attributable to
groundings. Thus, the environmental issues pertaining
to petrochemical transport in US waters did not align
well with the concerns of the international community
and the IMO.
Although the double-hull tank vessel design had
been developed in the late 1960s, most oil tank vessels
were of single-hull construction. Although some oil
companies utilized double-hulled vessels, the increased
costs, maintenance, and operational complexity of this
design prevented them from ever becoming an industry
standard. As of 1991 approximately 79% of the world’s
tank vessels had single hulls (NRC 1991).
The distribution of marine accidents contributing to
outflow prior to the passage of OPA90 is given in Figure
3 (NRC 1991). The data available for the pre-OPA90
period draws a distinction between barges and tankers;
thus, Figure 3 only refers to accidents of oil tankers that
are 10,000 dead weight tons (DWT). Furthermore,
the data do not include cargo transfer system failures.
The examination of this pre-OPA90 data reveals a
relative dominance—in terms of both frequency and
share of resulting outflow—of groundings in the distri-
bution of marine accidents contributing to spills within
US waters. The relatively shallow US ports and water-
ways, combined with the statistical dominance of
groundings, brought the double-hull requirement issue
to the forefront of US maritime regulation. The 1989
Exxon Valdez and the 1990 American Trader (1.5 million
liters or 394,000 gallons of outflow off the southern
California coast in February 1990) oil spills provided
the final justification for unanimous Congressional sup-
port.
The post-OPA90 era. Ten years after the Exxon Valdez
spill, it is apparent that this accident and OPA90 have
set the tone for the petrochemical shipping industry.
The opponents of OPA90 continue to argue that it does
not consider the best interests of the marine environ-
ment as it enlists only one, principal type of technology
that is primarily aimed at spill prevention, thus ignor-
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ing the other phases of a spill event: mitigation and
response. The question remains whether the USCG will
equivalently recommend alternative designs in concert
with IMO. The wording of the applicable US laws is very
specific and leaves the burden of such a recommenda-
tion upon the USCG.
The analysis of spill causation is approached under
specified conditions. All spills could be considered hu-
man error in that a tank vessel carrying petrochemicals
would not exist without human intent. This rationale
refers to the expression “we could eliminate all human-
induced environmental problems if we just remove the
humans.” Obviously, this is not a practical approach. In
this study, we define “human operator error” as an
element of failure, not the absolute source. By this
distinction, we conclude that mechanical equipment
failure and navigational system failure can be attribut-
able to human behavior as well as random occurrences.
Moreover, extreme weather events can be attributed to
meteorological error (an error in prediction or inter-
pretation), lack of due care by the operator, or a ran-
dom unforeseen act of nature (more rare and severe
than the proverbial “100-year storm”).
Data for 1992–1999 was extracted from the USCG
MSIS database (Dickey personal communication). This
criterion-based search combined all seaborne tank ves-
sels and included all reported petrochemical outflows
of 39800 liters (1000 gallons) within US waters (161
total spills). Furthermore, the data include cargo trans-
fer system failures, as it is one of the most frequent
accidents leading to unintentional outflow. First, the
data are presented in graphical form, but the precepts
of the hierarchical framework are also applied. Two
queries of the USCG MSIS database were run, such that
the distribution of marine accidents and preceding
failure incidents were extracted independently with re-
spect to frequency and consequence. From the MSIS
database, there were 137 discernible accident classifica-
tions with regard to failure incidents and marine acci-
dents out of the 161 total reported spills. The results of
these queries are presented in Figures 4 and 5 (for
additional post-OPA90 era data, including geographi-
cal distribution of outflow in US waters, refer to the
additional information and data listed on the Springer
website [http://www.link.springer-ny.com/link/service/
journals/00267/index.htm]).
The answer to the question, “what causes a seaborne
petrochemical spill from a tank vessel in US waters
during the post-OPA90 era” is revealed once the ante-
cedent events are examined in a hierarchical context. A
spill event is holistic in that it is a large event comprised
of multiple antecedent events. Upon closer examina-
tion, however, it is also hierarchical in that the outcome
of one event determines the occurrence of the next,
sequentially dependent event. The extracted data re-
sults are presented in a hierarchical context in Figures
Figure 3. Accident distribution for major petrochemical spills 40,000 liters (10,567 gallons) in US waters. 1980–1990 (NRC
1991).
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6 and 7 with respect to occurrence frequency and con-
sequence severity (outflow magnitude), thus defining
spill causation and characterizing the risk of petro-
chemical outflow in terms of the aggregated risk of the
individual causative elements.
Within Figures 6 and 7, the most frequent and
Figure 4. Marine accidents contributing to seaborne petrochemical spills 3800 liters (1000 gallons) in US waters, 1992–1999;
Source USCG (D. Dickey personal communication)
Figure 5. Failure incidents contributing to seaborne petrochemical spills 3800 liters (1000 gallons) within US Waters,
1992–1999; Source USCG (D. Dickey personal communication)
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most consequential paths are highlighted. In both
cases, the pathway leading from the source to human
operator error and on to the grounding accident are
the most frequent and most severe. However, Figure
6, it is apparent that cargo transfer system failures are
also significantly frequent. There Also is relative par-
ity among the resulting outflow volume between
groundings, collisions, and fire/explosions.
The dominance of human operator error justifies
an even greater allocation of resources to this caus-
ative element. The frequency and consequence of
grounding accidents further validate the structural
reinforcement of tank vessel bottoms in US waters.
However, it is notable that considerable outflow vol-
umes also originate from both collisions and fires.
While the occurrence frequency of fires and explo-
sions is very low (2.2%), the outflow volume is rather
significant in that it accounts for 19.3% of the total
outflow volume in US waters from 1992 to 1999. This
occurrence-to-outflow ratio is very telling and must
be considered along with the more apparent causa-
tion patterns noted above. In the case of fire/explo-
sion, this ratio is a significant 1.1 million liters
(279,500 gallons) of outflow per occurrence. How-
ever, this ratio merely examines the average outflow
per occurrence; it does not indicate the distribution
of events with regard to the resulting outflow volume.
The magnitude of this particular ratio is driven by
one very large outflow event of over 3 million liters
(800,000 gallons).
The occurrence frequencies of failure incidents
and marine accidents with respect to the resulting
outflow volume are graphed in Figures 8 and 9.
These figures reveal that while large outflow volumes
continue to occur, the post-OPA90 era is dominated
by small, frequent spills attributable to groundings,
cargo transfer system failure accidents, and human
operator failure incidents. However, the other caus-
ative factors also correlate to noteworthy outflow vol-
umes despite being less frequent. The occurrence-to-
outflow distributions in Figures 8 and 9 form a
quantitative foundation for the probabilistic model-
ing of each causative event. From these results, prob-
ability density functions (PDFs) can be established
for random variables representing outflow per caus-
ative factor.
Figure 6. Prevention phase of a seaborne petrochemical spill: frequency of occurrence and percent of total events, 1992–1999.
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Conclusion
Petrochemical spills are hierarchical in nature. A
spill event cannot occur without the hierarchical pro-
gression of antecedent events including an underway
source, an enabling failure incident, and a marine ac-
cident capable of breaching the integrity of a vessel’s
cargo containment structure. While a hierarchical pre-
sentation of data is not necessary to uncover the major
elements of causation, it does provide a logical and
organized framework for analysis. The principal out-
come of this research is a more robust understanding of
petrochemical spill causation in the post-OPA90 era.
The hierarchical presentation of the frequency and
severity of significant outflow events reveals the distri-
bution of the causative pathways leading to petrochem-
ical outflow. Relatively small, frequent outflows
40,000 liters (10,567 gallons) attributable to human
operator failure incidents, leading to grounding and
cargo transfer system failure accidents, dominate these
distributions. Given the shallowness of US waterways
and the prevalence of grounding accidents, a double
bottom structure appears necessary to effectively re-
duce unintentional cargo outflow. Therefore, struc-
tural regulations such as OPA90’s §4115 appear well
justified. However, it also apparent that a passive re-
straint system is secondary to the vigilant training of
tank vessel personnel in an attempt to minimize and
eliminate human operator errors that contribute to
outflow.
Environmental degradation resulting from human
error is not surprising or uncommon. The results of
this research demonstrate that despite advances in er-
ror prevention and prohibitive policy, significant unin-
tentional outflows continue to occur. However, the re-
sults also show marked improvement in terms of
decreasing frequency and volume of spill events. The
preliminary survey research that was the basis for this
paper found that for each and every element of the
causative framework, preventive initiatives are either in
place or being developed. The majority of these pre-
ventive programs—which were found to be exhaustive
and rigorous in nature— focus upon the human ele-
ment of the vessel system. Simply put, a tank vessel
carrying petrochemical cargo cannot occur without hu-
Figure 7. Prevention phase of a seaborne petrochemical spill: consequence of occurrence (percentage of total resulting outflow,
1992–1999).
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man intent; therefore, human operators are ultimately
and inescapably responsible for their vessel. While this
paper does identify other causative pathways that lead
to outflow, the preponderance of data pointing to hu-
man error alludes to the need for greater environmen-
tal stewardship on behalf of the petrochemical trans-
Figure 8. Distribution of marine accidents resulting in seaborne petrochemical outflows 3800 liters (1000 gallons) in US
waters, 1992–1999; source USCG (D. Dickey personal communication).
Figure 9. Distribution of failure incidents resulting in seaborne petrochemical outflows 3800 liters (1000 gallons) in US waters,
1992–1999; source USCG (D. Dickey personal communication).
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port industry. It is counter to the interests of all parties
involved for unintentional outflow to occur, as it not
only leads to environmental damage detriment, but
also decreased revenue. This dynamic appears to be the
primer within the debate regarding the environmental
implications of petrochemical spills as it fosters a col-
laborative approach to superior environmental perfor-
mance of tank vessels and, ultimately, the elimination
of cargo loss.
Further research is needed in the mitigation and
response phases of petrochemical outflow. Incorporat-
ing these two phases in the hierarchical context would
allow for a more comprehensive analysis of outflow
from source to response completion and environmen-
tal impact assessment. While OPA90 focuses primarily
on prevention and response, more research is needed
on not only the intermediate phase of mitigation, but
also on the holistic examination of the spill event from
source to response conclusion. This would include a
more thorough examination of accidents that not only
result in petrochemical outflows, but also those that do
not result in spillage in order to more accurately model
the conditional nature of each of the causative ele-
ments.
Finally, it is the opinion of the authors that pollution
response and reporting personnel should incorporate a
hierarchical approach in the classification of marine
casualties, as many pollution incident classifications
were not thoroughly indicative of the nature of outflow.
Spills should be classified methodically, by each of the
causative factors that contribute to the outflow.
Authors’ Note
The acceptance of this paper and subsequent revi-
sion occurred during a massive overhaul of the Coast
Guard’s Marine Safety database and data management
system. Numerous changes have been made to the
Marine Safety Information System (MSIS); this system
has been replaced by a new data management system
that also includes law enforcement and intelligence
information. As part of this new database, the causative
factors associated with a marine casualty are listed in a
more comprehensive and sequential manner. The
statements contained in this paper are those of the
authors; they are by no means a reflection of official
Coast Guard or United States policy.
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